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Abstract
This paper develops a long-run growth model for a major oil exporting economy
and derives conditions under which oil revenues are likely to have a lasting impact.
This approach contrasts with the standard literature on the "Dutch disease" and the
"resource curse", which primarily focuses on short-run implications of a temporary
resource discovery. Under certain regularity conditions and assuming a Cobb-Douglas
production function, it is shown that (log) oil exports enter the long-run output equa-
tion with a coe¢ cient equal to the share of capital (). The long-run theory is tested
using quarterly data on nine major oil economies, six of which are current members
of OPEC (Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela), plus Indonesia
which is a former member, and Mexico and Norway, which are members of the OECD.
Overall, the test results support the long-run theory. The existence of long-run rela-
tions between real output, foreign output and real oil income is established for six of
the nine economies considered. The exceptions, Mexico and Norway, do not possess
su¢ cient oil reserves for oil income to have lasting impacts on their economies. At their
current production rates, the proven oil reserves of Mexico and Norway are expected
to last 9 and 10 years respectively, as compared to reserve-production ratios of OPEC
members, which lie in the range of 45 to 125 years. For Indonesia, whose share of oil
income in GDP has been declining steadily over the past three decades, the theory
suggests that the e¤ect of oil income on the economys steady state growth rate will
vanish eventually, and this is indeed conrmed by the results. Sensible estimates of
 are also obtained across the six economies with long-run output equations, and im-
pulse responses are provided for the e¤ects of shocks to oil income and foreign output
in these economies.
JEL Classications: C32, C53, E17, F43, F47, Q32.
Keywords: Growth models, long run and error correcting relations, major oil
exporters, OPEC member countries, oil exports and foreign output shocks.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we develop a long-run output relation for a major oil exporting economy where
oil income to output ratio is expected to remain high over a prolonged period. The focus
of this analysis di¤ers from that of the "Dutch disease" and "resource curse" literature that
considers the revenues from the resource to be intrinsically temporary and focuses on the
relatively short-term implications of the resource discovery. See Corden and Neary (1982),
Krugman (1987), Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986), and van der Ploeg and Venables (2009)
for a recent survey. We extend the stochastic growth model developed in Binder and Pesaran
(1999) to allow for the possibility that a certain fraction of oil export revenues is invested
in the domestic economy. We distinguish between the two cases where the growth of oil
income, g0, is less than the natural growth rate (the sum of the population growth, n, and
the growth of technical progress, g), and when g0  g + n. Under the former, the e¤ects
of oil income on the economys steady growth rate will vanish eventually, whilst under the
latter, oil income enters the long-run output equation with a coe¢ cient which is equal to the
share of capital () if it is further assumed that the underlying production technology can
be represented by a Cobb-Douglas production function.
The empirical validity of the long-run theory is tested on eight large oil economies, with a
variety of development experiences and political systems, showing that the long-run output
equation derived in the paper applies equally to OPEC (Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia, and Venezuela) and OECD (Mexico and Norway) oil exporters. The long-run output
equation is tested and estimated using cointegration analysis by incorporating the theory-
consistent long-run output equation within a vector autoregressive error correction model
augmented with a foreign output variable. The inclusion of the foreign output variable allows
us to separate the long-run e¤ects of global technological developments from the (possible)
long-run impacts of oil income.
The test results and the estimates obtained support the theory and the existence of a
long-run relation between real domestic output, real oil income and real foreign output (all
measured in terms of domestic currency) for six of the eight economies considered. The
exceptions, Mexico and Norway, do not possess su¢ cient oil reserves for their oil income to
have lasting impacts on their steady state output growths. Although Mexico and Norway
are currently amongst the major oil exporters, their proven oil reserves are low compared
to the other major oil exporters. At their current production rates, the proven oil reserves
of Mexico and Norway are expected to last 9 and 10 years respectively, compared to the
reserve-production ratios of the six OPEC oil producers considered in this paper, which lie
in the range of 45 years (for Nigeria) to 125 years (for Venezuela).
Using the long-run output equations, we also obtain sensible estimates of  across the six
major oil exporters. The point estimates of  for these economies fall in the range of 0:11
to 0:18; except for Nigeria where  is very poorly estimated. These estimates are lower than
the values of 0:30   0:35 used in calibration studies of advanced economies, but are in line
with the estimates reported in a number of empirical studies in the literature that include
developing and oil-exporting economies. See, for instance, Pedroni (2007) and Cavalcanti
et al. (2011a). In addition, we nd that with the exception of Libya, the major oil economies
considered have experienced rates of technological progress that are comparable to those of
their major trading partners over the past three decades.
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Moreover, we estimate a VARX* model for Indonesia, a former OPEC member which
has seen its share of oil exports revenue in GDP declining over the past three decades, and
for which g0 < g + n. In the case of Indonesia, the theory predicts that out of the two
drivers of growth, only technology should have a signicant long-run impact on real output,
and indeed we nd that in the estimated long-run output equation for Indonesia only the
foreign output variable is statistically signicant. Real oil income does not seem to exert
any signicant e¤ect on real output in the long run; thus providing corroborative evidence
on the validity of the long-run output equation developed in this paper.
Finally, we examine the speed of response of the major oil exporters to shocks using per-
sistence proles that consider the e¤ects of system-wide shocks on the cointegrating output
equations and the generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) for the analysis of the
e¤ects of shocks to oil exports and foreign output on real output in major oil exporters. It
is found that shocks have permanent e¤ects on real output and tend to di¤use relatively
rapidly, within 2-3 years in most cases, which is much faster than the estimates obtained for
advanced economies.
The rest of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 develops a long run macroeconomic
model for an oil exporting economy and discusses the long-run restrictions applicable to oil
exporters. Section 3 describes the VARX* econometric model that embodies the long run
relation and considers the estimates of the output equation for major oil exporters. The
GIRFs of the e¤ects of shocks to oil exports on output in the case of the major oil exporters
are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 A Theory of Economic Growth for a Major Oil Ex-
porter
Most papers in the growth literature do not include natural resource abundant economies, in
particular oil exporting countries, in their cross-country empirical analysis. Furthermore, the
literature that specically deals with resource abundant economies tends to treat revenues
that ow from such resources as "intrinsically temporary", and only considers the short
term e¤ects. See, for example, van der Ploeg and Venables (2009). A number of early
studies also considered the macroeconomic e¤ects of the resource discovery and focussed
on the "Dutch disease" phenomenon rst experienced in Netherlands after the large, but
short-lived, discovery of gas in 1960s. See, for example, Corden and Neary (1982), Krugman
(1987), and Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) among others.
The Dutch disease hypothesis postulates that an exogenous unexpected increase in for-
eign exchange revenues from the resource, due to rising prices or output, will result in real
exchange rate appreciation and a fall in output and employment of the non-resource traded
goods sector, often manufacturing. This by itself need not have adverse long run implica-
tions for the economy as a whole. One would expect the economy to re-adjust once the
revenues from the resource are diminished or vanish altogether, unless there are important
non-convexities or imperfections in the economy. For example, if the manufacturing sector
is subject to economies of scale or learning by doing, the loss of manufacturing capacity will
be very costly to reverse.
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The more recent literature on resource abundance and economic growth focusses on the
political economy considerations and argues that large windfalls from the resource create
incentives for rent-seeking activities that involve corruption (Mauro (1995) and Leite and
Weidmann (1999)), voracity (Lane and Tornell (1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999)), and
possibly civil conicts (Collier and Hoe­ er (2004)).1 Some of these considerations have been
recently formalized by Caselli and Cunningham (2009) where they attempt to characterize
conditions under which an increase in the size of the resource rent leads to a decrease in
real output, the so called "natural resource curse" hypothesis. Empirical support for this
hypothesis was originally provided by Sachs and Warner (1995) who showed the existence
of a negative relationship between real GDP growth per capita and di¤erent measures of
resource abundance, such as the ratio of resource exports to GDP. The nding that resource
rich countries tend to perform poorly when compared to economies that are not well endowed
with natural resources is clearly paradoxical and require further explanations and naturally
has led to a growing empirical literature.
Most papers in the resource curse literature tend to follow Sachs and Warners cross-
sectional specication introducing new explanatory variables, while others derive theoretical
models that are loosely related to their empirical specication. Some of these papers conrm
Sachs and Warners results, but there is an emerging literature, including Brunnschweiler
and Bulte (2008), Cavalcanti et al. (2011a), and Cavalcanti et al. (2011b), which argues
that the so-called resource curse paradox does not exist, and that while resource dependence
does not a¤ect growth, resource abundance in fact positively a¤ects growth.2 Thus, from
the empirical literature, there is no clear cut answer to whether natural resource abundance
is a blessing or a curse. The recent theoretical work of Caselli and Cunningham (2009) is not
conclusive either and, perhaps not surprisingly, can yield outcomes that are not compatible
with the resource curse hypothesis.
While in the short run we would expect that an increase in oil export revenues would put
pressure on the real exchange rate, the Dutch disease channel will only harm an economy
in the long run if these oil revenues are short-lived or subject to such volatility that in
some periods oil export revenues are negligible while in other periods they are prominent.
For major oil exporting countries, of which many started oil extraction and exports in the
beginning of the 20th century, the reserve-to-extraction ratio indicates that they are capable
of producing for many more decades even in the absence of new oil eld discoveries or major
advances in oil exploration and extraction technologies.
Although it is true that natural resources are ultimately exhaustible, for the purpose of
macroeconomic analysis over the medium term it is more realistic to view such resources
as permanent. For example, in the case of Iran despite a 100 years history of exploration
and production, Irans current estimated reserve-to-extraction ratio suggests a further 87
years of oil production. In addition, Iran has the second largest natural gas reserves after
Russia, around 60 percent of which is yet to be developed.3 Although it is clear that Irans
oil and gas reserves will be exhausted eventually, this is likely to take place over a relatively
1For early contributions on the importance of rent seeking in oil exporting economies see Mahdavi (1970)
and Pesaran (1982)
2In a recent paper, Cavalcanti et al. (2012) argue that it is the volatility of commodity prices rather than
abundance per se, that drives the "resource curse" paradox.
3See, for example, Amuzegar (2008) and the British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy.
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Figure 1: Oil Export Revenues to Income Ratios for Major Oil Exporters
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Source: GDP data is from the IMF International Financial Statistics and oil export data is from OPEC
Annual Statistical Bulletin.
long period. Of course, Iran is not unique in this regard. As Figure 1 shows most other
OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) member countries such as Saudi
Arabia, Venezuela, Nigeria, Algeria, United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, and a few countries
outside OPEC such as Norway and Russia have similar oil income GDP ratios that have
remained relatively stable over time. Therefore, there is little evidence to suggest that in
these economies oil income will be diminishing any time soon.
To summarize, most macroeconomic analysis of oil revenues tend to take a short-term
perspective. They usually focus on the e¤ects of oil revenues on the real exchange rate (Dutch
disease) and government budget expansion, thus failing to consider the e¤ects of oil revenues
on long-run growth. This approach makes sense for countries with a limited amount of oil
reserves, but not for major oil exporting countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Therefore,
the aim of the next sub-section is to develop a long-run theory for oil exporters in which oil
export revenues a¤ect the growth rate of income in the long run. In this process rent-seeking
and other political economy considerations are clearly still important, and tend to manifest
themselves in the equilibrium level of capital stock and can inuence the steady state growth
of the economy. However, such political economy considerations will not be addressed in this
paper.
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2.1 Long-run Output Equation for Oil Exporting Economies
Consider an oil exporting economy with a constant return to scale production function in
labour, Lt, and capital stock, Kt;:
Yt = AtLtf

Kt
AtLt

; (1)
where Yt is the real output, and At is an index of labour augmented technological progress.
Following the literature, it will be assumed that At and Lt are exogenously given and follow
general linear processes dened by
ln(At) = a0 + gt+ uat; (2)
and
ln (Lt) = l0 + nt+ ult: (3)
where a0 and l0 are economy-specic initial endowments of technology and labour, g and n
are the steady state growth rates of technology and labour input respectively, and uat and
ult follow general linear processes possibly with unit roots.
Denote by Xt the real value of (net) oil exports
Xt =
EtP
o
t X
o
t
Pt
; (4)
where P ot is the price of oil per barrel in US dollar, X
o
t is the total number of barrels of oil
exports, Et is the exchange rate in terms of US dollar, and Pt is the consumer price index.
Note that we could also include oil as an input in the production process but we abstract
from this to simplify the analysis. Let t be the value of capital in terms of e¤ective labour
input:
t =
Kt
AtLt
; (5)
and t denote the value of real oil exports in terms of e¤ective units of labour input:
t =
Xt
AtLt
: (6)
Then the capital accumulation equation can be written as
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + s(t)Yt +  (t)Xt; (7)
where  is the rate of depreciation (0 <  < 1), s(t) and  (t) are the shares of non-
oil output and (net) oil income that are invested, and t = (t; t)
0 is the vector of state
variables. It is assumed that s(t) and  (t) lie in the range (0; 1), and that oil is produced
without the use of domestic resources.
Using (2) and (3), the general specication for ln(AtLt) is given by:
ln(AtLt) = a0 + l0 + (g + n) t+ ut;
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where ut = uat + ult. Hence
 ln(At+1Lt+1) = g + n+ut+1: (8)
Using (8) we can write the capital accumulation equation given in (7) in terms of e¤ective
labour units:
t+1 = [(1  )t + s(t)f (t) +  (t)t] exp ( g   n ut+1) : (9)
Note thatut+1 is a stationary process irrespective of whether the processes for At or Lt have
unit roots. The presence of a unit root in At is, however, essential if log per capita output is
to have a unit root, a hypothesis that cannot be rejected when tested using historical output
series.
To solve for t, the process for real oil revenues must also be specied. Given that oil
revenues are dominated by oil price movements and the latter is best approximated by a
random walk model with a drift, we assume that
 ln (Xt+1) = g
o +vt+1; (10)
where go is the drift coe¢ cient, and vt  iid (0; 2v). Given (8) and (10) we have:
 ln
 
t+1

= go +vt+1   (g + n+ut+1)
= go   g   n+vt+1  ut+1: (11)
The possibility of a long run impact from oil income to per capita output depends on the
growth of oil income (go) relative to the combined growth of labour and technology. In the
case where go < g + n, t ! 0 as t!1, and the importance of oil income in the economy
will tend towards zero in the limit and the standard growth model will become applicable.
In this case oil income is neither a blessing nor a curse in the long run. This is as to be
expected since with oil income rising but at a slower pace than the growth of real output, the
share of oil income in aggregate output eventually tends towards zero. Therefore, a resource
could be non-depletable but still have no long-run impacts.
But if go  g+ n, oil income continues to exert an independent impact on the process of
capital accumulation even in the long run. Under this case t 6= 0 for all t, and scaling (9)
by t we obtain:
t+1
t+1
=

(1  ) t
t
+ s(t)
f (t)
t
+  (t)

exp ( g   n ut+1) exp
   lnt+1 : (12)
Denoting the scaled variables by v such that ezt = zt=t, and using (11) we then have
et+1 = [(1  ) et + s(t)eyt +  (t)] exp ( go  vt+1) ;
where eyt = yt=t = f(t)=t. In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, f (t) = t ;
where 0 <  < 1 is the share of capital, we have
et+1 = [(1  ) et + s(t)~t +  (t)] exp ( go  vt+1) ; (13)
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where s(t) = s(t)=
1 
t = s(t)
 (1 )
0 e
 (1 )(go g n)t (1 )(vt ut). We need now to con-
sider the cases where go > g + n, and go = g + n, separately. Under the former and since
1  > 0, and s(t) is bounded in t, then limt!1 s(t) = 0; and for su¢ ciently large t (13)
behaves as et+1 = [(1  ) et +  (t)] exp ( go  vt+1) ;
and ~1 = limt!1et will exits so long as E [(1  ) exp ( go  vt+1)] < 1. In the case
where vt is normally distributed this condition can be written as go > 2v + ln(1   ), and
will be satised if growth of oil income is not too volatile. Based on historical data on real
oil prices, v is around 20 per cent per annum, and taking  = 0:05 we would then need that
go > 0:04  0:0513 which is clearly met in practice.
In the knife-edge case where go = g+n, the limiting distribution of et will be the function
of both saving rates (savings out of domestic output and oil income) and will be ergodic only
if certain regularity conditions on s(t)=et and  (t) =et are met. Note that in the present
case s(t) = s(t)
 (1 )
0 e
 (1 )(vt ut). Following Binder and Pesaran (1999), and assuming
that s(t)=et and  (t) =et are monotonic in t and that certain regularity conditions hold,
then it can be shown that as t ! 1, et+1 ! ~1, where ~1 is a time-invariant random
variable with a non-degenerate probability distribution function.
To summarize, subject to familiar regularity conditions, we have
lnt+1  I (0) , if go < g + n; (14)
and
ln et+1 = lnt+1   lnt+1  I (0) , if go  g + n; (15)
where I(0) represents a stationary (integrated of order 0) variable.Also since under a Cobb-
Douglas production function
lnt = 
 1 [ln(Yt=Lt)  ln (At)] (16)
then in terms of per capita output we have
ln(Yt=Lt)  ln (At)  I (0) , if go < g + n; (17)
and
ln(Yt=Lt)  (1  ) lnAt    ln(Xt=Lt)  I (0) , if go  g + n: (18)
Therefore, the issue of whether oil income is likely to have a lasting impact on per capita
output growth can be tested by a cointegration analysis involving log per capita output, log
of real per capita oil income and an index of technological progress. In such an empirical
analysis it is important that At can be measured independently of oil income. With this in
mind and following Garratt et al. (2003) we assume that domestic technology evolves from
a di¤usion and adaptation of foreign technology denoted by At . Specically we assume that
ln(At) = a

0 +  ln(A

t ) + t; (19)
where  measures the extent to which foreign technology is di¤used and adapted successfully
by the domestic economy in the long run, t  I (0) represents the transient di¤erences
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between the levels of technological innovations, and a0 is a xed scaling factor. If  < 1;
this implies that the domestic technology is falling behind the rest of the world, while  >
1 implies that the domestic technology is quickly catching up and outperforming foreign
technological growth, while  = 1 represents the case where domestic and foreign technology
are assumed to grow at the same rate.
Denoting foreign capital stock in e¤ective labour units by t , and assuming that the
production technology in the foreign economy also follows the Cobb-Douglas production
function, f (t ) = (

t )
, where  is the share of capital in the foreign economy, we have
ln (Y t =L

t )  lnAt =  ln(t ): (20)
Using a similar line of argument as above for an economy without oil it also follows that
ln(t )  I (0).4 Using this result in (20) and together with (19) now yields
ln(At)   ln (Y t =Lt ) = a0    ln(t ) + t  I (0) ;
which upon substitution in (17) and (18) gives the following long-run relations in observables
ln(Yt=Lt)   ln (Y t =Lt )  I (0) , if go < g + n; (21)
and
ln(Yt=Lt)  (1  ) ln (Y t =Lt )   ln(Xt=Lt)  I (0) , if go  g + n: (22)
For the purpose of econometric modeling of the long-run interactions of real oil income
with the other variables in the economy, it is convenient to decompose ln (Xt=Lt) as
ln (Xt=Lt) = ln(Et=Pt) + ln(P
o
t X
o
t =Lt):
Using this in (22) now yields
ln(Yt=Lt)  (1  ) ln (Y t =Lt )   ln(Et=Pt)   ln(P ot Xot =Lt)  I (0) , if go  g + n:
For empirical applications the analysis can be simplied if ln(Lt) and ln(Lt ) are trend sta-
tionary so that
ln(Lt)  n t  I (0) and ln(Lt )  n t  I (0) ,
where n and n are the labour force growth rates of the domestic and the world economy
respectively. This allows for the possibility of both foreign and domestic demand shocks
as long as they are temporary, or in other words I (0). In this case the long-run output
equations become
ln(Yt)   ln (Y t )  (n  n)t  I (0) , if go < g + n; (23)
and
ln(Yt)   1 ln (Y t )   2 ln(Et=Pt)   3 ln(P ot Xot )  yt  I (0) , if go  g + n; (24)
4The assumption that the foreign economy does not have oil can be relaxed by assuming that the growth
of oil income in the foreign economy is less than its combined growth of labour and technology.
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where
 1 = (1   2);  2 =  3 = ; and y = (1  )(n  n): (25)
Equation (24) is su¢ ciently general and covers both cases where go < g+n and go  g+n:
Under the former  1 = ,  2 =  3 = 0, whilst under the latter  2 =  3 6= 0. This expanded
formulation is also convenient for econometrics analysis as it distinguishes between the real
exchange rate e¤ect, ln(Et=Pt), which is best treated as endogenous, and the logarithm of oil
exports in US dollar, ln(P ot X
o
t ), which for all practical purposes can be viewed as exogenous
for estimation purposes.
The above formulation further allows us to test other hypotheses of interest concerning
 and y. The value of  provides information on the long-run di¤usion of technology to
the oil exporting economy. The di¤usion of technology is at par with the rest of the world
if  = 1, whilst a value of  below unity suggests ine¢ ciency that prevents the adoption of
best practice techniques, possibly due to rent-seeking activities. When  = 1 steady state
per capita output growth in the oil exporting economy can only exceed that of the rest of
the world if oil income per capita is rising faster than the steady state per capita output in
the rest of the world. The steady state output growth in the oil exporting economy could
be lower than the rest of the world per capita output growth if  < 1. In the case of most
resource abundant economies, where go < g + n, their steady state growth rates cannot
exceed that of the rest of the world unless  > 1.
Finally, in the context of our theoretical derivations, it is important to note that the
empirical literature which is based on cross-section regressions on initial levels of per capita
income captures short-term deviations from the steady states and in view of the substantial
heterogeneity that exists across countries can be quite misleading, particularly as far as
identication of  and inferences on management ine¢ ciency of resource abundant economies
are concerned.
3 Empirical Applications to Major Oil Exporters
In what follows we test the validity of the long-run output theory on a number of major oil
exporters with varying levels of oil reserves, development experiences, and institutional qual-
ities, and provide estimates of the structural parameters,  and , implied by the long-run
output equation (24). In particular, we consider six OPEC members, three of which are lo-
cated in the Middle East (Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia), one in Latin America (Venezuela),
and a further two in Africa (Libya and Nigeria). These economies di¤er considerably from
each other in terms of geographical location, population density, institutional quality, and
the level of proven oil reserves, but have one important feature in common, namely that oil
exports play a signicant role in their economies, albeit with di¤erent degrees. See Table
1. For example, Saudi Arabia and Iran have the largest oil reserves in the world, but Saudi
Arabia exports more than 2.7 times that of Iran. In addition, Saudi Arabias revenues from
oil exports to GDP ratio stood at 49.7% as compared to 25.3% in the case of Iran.
For comparison we shall also estimate long-run output equations for Mexico and Norway,
the largest oil exporters amongst the OECD economies, and Indonesia a former OPEC
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Table 1: Oil Reserves, Production and Institutional Quality Index for Major Oil
Exporters, averages over 2006-2008
Country Oil Reserves Oil Reserve- Oil Exports Oil Exports Polity Index
(Billion Barrels) Production Ratio (Million Barrels Revenue-GDP [ 10; 10]
(Years) per day) Ratio (%)
Indonesia 4.0 11.2 0.3 2.0 8
Iran 138.1 87.7 2.6 25.3 -6
Kuwait 101.5 102.9 1.7 39.7 -7
Libya 43.1 65.0 1.4 55.5 -7
Mexico 12.3 9.8 1.7 4.7 8
Nigeria 37.2 44.9 2.2 35.6 4
Norway 8.1 8.5 2.0 14.3 10
Saudi Arabia 264.2 67.6 7.1 49.7 -10
Venezuela 119.7 124.7 1.9 23.3 5
Source: GDP data is from the IMF International Financial Statistics, oil export data is from OPEC Annual
Statistical Bulletin, and oil reserve and production data is from the British Petroleum Statistical Review
of World Energy. Polity, which is often used as a measure of institutional quality of a country, is an index
between -10 and 10 from the Polity IV Project.
member.5 In terms of our theory what matters is the magnitude of oil reserves and the
long-term sustainability of oil incomes. As can be seen from Table 1, at the current levels
of production, oil reserves of Mexico and Norway are expected to last only for a further
9-10 years. Similarly, the reserve-production ratio for Indonesia is 11.2 years, with crude oil
export revenue to GDP ratio of only around 2%. In contrast, oil reserve-production ratios
of the six major OPEC oil exporters range from a low of 45 years in the case of Nigeria to
a high of 125 years for Venezuela.
While the countries under consideration have very di¤erent political systems and institu-
tional economic arrangements, our theory suggests that these di¤erences can only a¤ect the
estimates of the parameters rather than the nature of the long-run relationship that holds
between outputs (domestic and foreign) and oil export revenues. For the applicability of our
analysis, what matters most is the extent to which oil revenues are likely to be sustainable
over the medium to long term, and in this regard it is the oil reserve-production ratio that
could be important as to whether oil income enters the long-run output equation as a major
determinant. Having a range of countries with di¤erent levels of reserve-production ratios
allows us to shed further light on the relevance of the long-run theory developed in this
paper.
5We would also have liked to include Russia in our study, as it is the second largest oil exporter in the
world (Saudi Arabia being the rst). However, due to the lack of su¢ ciently long time series data this was
not possible.
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3.1 The VARX* Error Correcting Model
We need to set up an econometric framework within which the long-run theory can be tested.
To this end we rst re-write the output equation as
yt    1yt =  2(et   pt) +  3xot + cy + yt+ y;t (26)
where cy is an unrestricted xed constant, y;t is a mean zero stationary process, and
yt = ln(GDPt=CPIt), et = ln(Et), pt = ln(CPIt), (27)
where GDPt is the nominal Gross Domestic Product, CPIt is the consumer price index, and
Et is the number of domestic currency per one US dollar. The two exogenous variables in the
model are foreign output, yt , and oil income in US dollars dened as xot = ln(P
o
t X
o
t ), where
P ot is the nominal price of oil per barrel in US dollars, and X
o
t is the domestic oil export
in thousands of barrels per day. The data for yt, et, and pt are obtained from Cashin et al.
(2012), while the data on oil exports, xot, is obtained from the OPEC Annual Statistical
Bulletin. Details of the data sources is provided in a supplement which is available from the
authors on request.
For the eight countries under consideration, foreign outputs were computed as trade
weighted averages of log real output indices (yjt) of country is trading partners.6 Specically,
yit =
51X
j=1
wijyjt; i = 1; 2; :::; 8; (28)
where wij is the trade share of country j for country i, computed as a three-year average to
reduce the impact of individual yearly movements on the trade weights.7 The trade weights
were computed as
wij =
Tij;2006 + Tij;2007 + Tij;2008
Ti:2006 + Ti:2007 + Ti:2008
;
where Tijt is the bilateral trade of country i with country j during a given year t and is
calculated as the average of exports and imports of country i with j, and Tit =
PN
j=1 Tijt
(the total trade of country i) for t = 2006; 2007; 2008; in the case of all countries except for
Iran.8 As explained below, we had to use a shorter sample period for Iran, and accordingly
the trade weights were based on the average of trades over the three years 2001-2003.
The long run relation given by equation (26) can be written (for a particular oil exporter)
more compactly as deviation from equilibrium (the country subscript i is suppressed for
notational convenience):
y;t = 
0zt   cy   yt (29)
6The countries included are Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Korea,
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Nor-
way, Oman, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela.
For more details see Cashin et al. (2012).
7A similar approach has also been followed in global VAR models estimated in the literature. See, for
example, Dees et al. (2007).
8The trade weights are computed based on data from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics and data on
the foreign variables are obtained from Cashin et al. (2012).
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where zt = (x0t;x
0
t )
0, with xt = (yt, et   pt)0, xt = (yt , xot)0, and 
0
=
  1  2  1  3.
The long run theory for oil exporting countries, as derived in Section 2.1, requires two
further restrictions on the output equation (26), namely  2 =  3 =  and  1 =  (1  ),
where we are interested in seeing whether in fact the coe¢ cients of the real exchange rate
and total revenues from oil exports are the same and equal to the share of capital in output
() and whether technological progress in the country of interest is on par with that of the
rest of the world, in other words whether  = 1, and as a result the coe¢ cient of the foreign
real output is equal to (1  ).
The VARX*(s; s) model that embodies y;t is constructed from a suitably restricted
version of the VAR in zt. In the present application zt = (x0t;x
0
t )
0 is partitioned into the
2 1 vector of endogenous variables, xt = (yt, et   pt)0 ; and the 2 1 vector of the weakly
exogenous variables, xt = (y

t , xot)
0. In the case of all the eight countries, the hypothesis that
the four variables in zt are I(1) cannot be rejected. Moreover, it is easily established that
the two exogenous variables, yt and xot, are not cointegrated, again for all eight countries
under consideration.9 Under these conditions, following Pesaran et al. (2000), the VAR in
zt can be decomposed into the conditional model for the endogenous variables:
xt =  xzt 1 +
s 1X
i=1
	ixt i +0xt +
s 1X
i=1
ix

t i + a0 + a1t+ t; (30)
and the marginal model for the exogenous variables:
xt =
s 1X
i=1
 izt i + b0 + uxt; (31)
If the model includes an unrestricted linear trend, in general there will be quadratic trends
in the level of the variables when the model contains unit roots. To avoid this, the trend
coe¢ cients are restricted such that a1 = x; where  is an 4 1 vector of free coe¢ cients,
see Pesaran et al. (2000) and Section 6.3 in Garratt et al. (2006). The nature of the
restrictions on a1 depends on the rank of x. In the case where x is full rank, a1 is
unrestricted, whilst it is restricted to be equal to 0 when the rank of x is zero. Under the
restricted trend coe¢ cients the conditional model can be written as
xt =  x [zt 1   (t  1)] +
s 1X
i=1
	ixt i +0xt +
s 1X
i=1
ix

t i + ~a0 + t; (32)
where ~a0 = a0 +x. In the literature this specication is referred to as the vector error
correcting model with weakly exogenous I(1) variables, or VECX*(s; s) for short. Note that
~a0 remains unrestricted since a0 is not restricted. For consistent and e¢ cient estimation (and
inference) we only require the conditional model as specied in (30).
The long-run theory imposes a number of restrictions on x and . First, for the con-
ditional model to embody the equilibrium error dened by, (29), we must have x = x
0,
which in turn implies that rank(x) = 1. Furthermore, the restrictions on the trend coe¢ -
cients are given byx = x
0 = . Since under cointegration x 6= 0, it then follows that
9To save space these test results are not reported here but are available on request.
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a trend will be absent from the long run relations if 0 = 0. These restrictions are known
as co-trending restrictions, meaning that the linear trends in the various variables of the
long run relations get cancelled out. This hypothesis is important in the analysis of output
convergence between domestic and the foreign variables, since without such a co-trending
restriction the two output series will diverge even if they are shown to be cointegrated.
3.2 Tests and Estimation Results
With the exception of Iran all country specic VARX*(si; si ) models are estimated using
quarterly observations over the period 1979Q1-2009Q4. We had to estimate the model for
Iran over the shorter sample period of 1979Q1-2006Q4, since no o¢ cial national account
data have been released by Iran from 2007 onwards. The lag orders, si and si , were selected
using Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC), setting the
maximum lag orders to smax = 4 and smax = 2. It is interesting that the selected lag orders
ended up to be s^i = 2 and s^i = 1, the same across all eight countries. Using Johansens
maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics we then tested the null of no cointegration between
xt = (yt, et   pt)0 and xt = (yt , xot)0.
The cointegration test results are summarized in Table 2, and clearly reject the null of
no cointegration at 5% level in the case of Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, when
using the trace test. The null is also rejected at 10% level in the case of Libya. For the two
remaining economies, Norway and Mexico, the null of no cointegration cannot be rejected
even at 10% level. Similar test results are obtained when using the maximum eigenvalue
test, although the trace test is often preferred based on its more satisfactory small sample
properties.
Overall, the test results are supportive of the existence of a long-run relationship between
domestic output and real oil income for most of the major oil exporters. The exceptions,
Noway and Mexico, could be explained either by lack of power of the cointegration test, or the
fact that oil income has not been su¢ ciently dominant in these economies. The lack of power
argument seems less convincing in the present applications since the time series sample used
is relatively long (T = 121), and we obtain rejection in the case of Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria,
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela using the same sample size, and for Iran even when a slightly
smaller sample size is used. It seems more plausible to conclude that oil income has not been
su¢ ciently important for Mexico and Norway over the sample period under consideration.
This view is further supported by the fact that the oil reserve-production ratios of these
economies (at 9 and 10 years) are much lower than those of the other six major oil exporters
(ranging from 45 to 125 years) included in our study. See the discussion in Section 3 and
Table 1.
In the second stage of our empirical evaluation we focussed on the six countries for which
the existence of the long-run relation, inclusive of the oil income variable, could not be
rejected. We estimated the output equation, (26), subject to the co-trending restriction,
y = 0. The log-likelihood ratio (LR) statistic for testing the co-trending restriction is
asymptotically distributed as a chi-squared variate with one degree of freedom. But we
are working with a relatively large dimensional VARX* model using a moderate number of
time series observations. In such situations it is known that the LR tests could over-reject
in small samples (see, for example, Gredenho¤ and Jacobson (2001) as well as Gonzalo
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Table 2: Cointegration Rank Test Statistics for the VARX*(2,1) Models with
Endogenous Variables (y, ep) and the Weakly Exogenous Variables (y*, xo)
Iran Kuwait
Critical Values Critical Values
H0 H1 Statistic 5% 10% H0 H1 Statistic 5% 10%
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic (a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 31.78 26.10 24.04 r = 0 r = 1 32.14 27.17 24.42
r  1 r = 2 8.23 18.41 16.38 r  1 r = 2 17.83 18.22 16.23
(b) Trace statistic (b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 40.00 37.50 34.56 r = 0 r = 1 49.97 37.78 33.83
r  1 r = 2 8.23 18.41 16.38 r  1 r = 2 17.83 18.22 16.23
Libya Mexico
Critical Values Critical Values
H0 H1 Statistic 5% 10% H0 H1 Statistic 5% 10%
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic (a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 27.55 27.17 24.42 r = 0 r = 1 18.49 27.17 24.42
r  1 r = 2 6.49 18.22 16.23 r  1 r = 2 11.17 18.22 16.23
(b) Trace statistic (b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 34.04 37.78 33.83 r = 0 r = 1 29.66 37.78 33.83
r  1 r = 2 6.49 18.22 16.23 r  1 r = 2 11.17 18.22 16.23
Nigeria Norway
Critical Values Critical Values
H0 H1 Statistic 5% 10% H0 H1 Statistic 5% 10%
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic (a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 27.63 27.17 24.42 r = 0 r = 1 10.08 27.17 24.42
r  1 r = 2 5.76 18.22 16.23 r  1 r = 2 7.68 18.22 16.23
(b) Trace statistic (b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 33.40 37.78 33.83 r = 0 r = 1 17.77 37.78 33.83
r  1 r = 2 5.76 18.22 16.23 r  1 r = 2 7.68 18.22 16.23
Saudi Arabia Venezuela
Critical Values Critical Values
H0 H1 Statistic 5% 10% H0 H1 Statistic 5% 10%
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic (a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 29.22 27.17 24.42 r = 0 r = 1 25.95 27.17 24.42
r  1 r = 2 19.17 18.22 16.23 r  1 r = 2 16.54 18.22 16.23
(b) Trace statistic (b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 48.39 37.78 33.83 r = 0 r = 1 42.49 37.78 33.83
r  1 r = 2 19.17 18.22 16.23 r  1 r = 2 16.54 18.22 16.23
Notes: All the underlying VARX* models are of order (2,1) and contain unrestricted intercept and restricted
trend coe¢ cients. yt and xot are treated as weakly exogenous, non-cointegrated I(1) variables. The test
statistics refer to Johansens log-likelihood-based maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics and are computed
using 110 observations from 1979Q3 to 2006Q4 for Iran and 121 observations from 1979Q4 to 2009Q4 for
all other countries. The 5 percent and 10 percent simulated critical values are computed by stochastic
simulations and 1000 replications.
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(1994), Haug (1996) and Abadir et al. (1999)). To deal with the small sample problem
we computed bootstrapped critical values based on 1,000 replications of the LR statistic.
Using the observed initial values of each variable, the estimated model, and a set of random
innovations, an articial data set is generated for each of the 1,000 replications under the
assumption that the estimated version of the model is the true data-generating process. For
each of the replicated data sets, we rst estimate our VECX* model subject to the exact
identifying restriction (which sets the coe¢ cient of yt equal to  1), and then subject to the
co-trending restriction. Finally, the empirical distribution of the LR test statistic is derived
using the 1,000 replications.
The LR statistics for the co-trending restriction (y = 0) are summarized on the left panel
of Table 3, together with the associated 1%, 5%, and 10% bootstrapped critical values. The
test results clearly show that except for Iran the co-trending restriction cannot be rejected at
the 1% level for the other ve countries. If we adopt the 5% level, the co-trending restriction
is rejected in the case of Nigeria, but overall the test results support the restrictions, and
suggest that trend output growth in these economies is broadly in line with trends in output
growths in the rest of the world. The clear rejection of the co-trending restriction in the
case of Iran could reect Irans relative isolation from the global economy over the past 30
years, since the 1979 Revolution. In addition to the initial economic disruptions due to the
Revolution, other factors such as the eight-year war with Iraq, and the prolonged period of
economic sanctions by the US and some of the European economies against Iran could have
further contributed to this outcome.
Subject to the co-trending restriction, we then tested the further theory restriction given
by  2 =  3 = , see (25). The test results are summarized on the right panel of Table
3. The joint hypothesis of y = 0 and  2 =  3 cannot be rejected at the 1% level for all
countries considered with the exception of Iran. Under these restrictions the estimates of
 1 and  2 (= ) together with their asymptotic standard errors are provided in Table 3, as
well as an implied estimate of , computed as b = b 1=(1   ^2).10 The parameter estimates,
 ^1 and  ^2 (= ^), all have the correct signs and are highly statistically signicant, with the
exception of the estimate of  for Nigeria, which is statistically signicant only at the 10%
level, and is not that well estimated. The estimates of  for the remaining ve countries
(including the estimate obtained for Iran where the theory restrictions are rejected), lie in
the relatively narrow range of 0.11 (for Iran) to 0.18 (for Venezuela). These estimates are
in line with the estimate of between 0.115 and 0.172 reported for a panel of oil exporting
countries in Cavalcanti et al. (2011a) and between 0.13 and 0.20 for a panel of 51 countries
in Pedroni (2007). For all countries, but Libya, the implied estimates of  is larger than 0.70,
and suggest a reasonable but partial di¤usion and adaptation of technological advancement
for the major oil exporters. In this regard Libya seems to have been left out. The result
for Iran should also be treated with caution considering that the co-trending restrictions has
already been rejected in her case.
We also considered the e¤ects of setting  = 1 on the estimates of . The results are
summarized in Table 4. Imposing such a restriction seems to be innocuous in the case of
Iran, Kuwait and Nigeria, and results in relatively small increases in the LR statistic and
10All estimations and test results are obtained using Microt 5.0. For further technical details see Pesaran
and Pesaran (2009), Section 22.10.
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hardly changes the estimate of . However, the imposition of  = 1 signicantly raises
the LR statistics for the remaining countries. Overall we favour the cross-country estimates
provided in Table 3 where the restriction  = 1 is not imposed.
Table 4: Estimates of the Share of Capital in Output for Major Oil Exporters
Assuming that Domestic Technological Progress is on par with that of the Rest
of the World
Bootstrapped
Country b 2 = b LR Critical Values
(d:f: = 3) 1% 5% 10%
Iran 0:13 19:40 20:62 13:07 10:37
(0:05)
Kuwait 0:14 7:80 15:57 10:96 9:25
(0:06)
Libya 0:07 11:27 19:31 13:50 10:99
(0:05)
Nigeria 0:49 14:48 19:06 14:03 11:82
(0:28)
Saudi Arabia 0:25 11:23 19:31 13:43 10:89
(0:08)
Venezuela 0:35 3:21 17:83 12:01 10:07
(0:09)
Notes: The underlying VARX* model for each country is of order (2,1) and contains unrestricted intercept
and restricted trend coe¢ cients. For all countries except for Iran the model is estimated using data between
1979Q2 and 2009Q4. For Iran the estimation is over the period 1979Q1 to 2006Q4. LR is the log-likelihood
ratio statistic for testing the long-run relations, testing jointly three over-identifying restrictions, namely the
co-trending restriction (y = 0), the theory restriction ( 2 =  3 = ), and  = 1. The bootstrapped upper
ten, ve, and one percent critical values of the LR statistics are computed with 1,000 replications.
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3.3 A Former OPEC Member: The Case of Indonesia
The long-run output relation for major oil exporting economies developed in this paper has so
far only been tested on countries, where the oil income to output ratio is expected to remain
high over a prolonged period. However, there are many cases in which a country has exported
large quantities of oil, but as its oil production peaks (and domestic consumption increases)
it nds its oil income falling drastically. An example of such a country is Indonesia which
joined OPEC in 1962 but suspended its membership from January 2009. While Indonesian
oil production peaked in mid 1990s, the share of oil exports in GDP has been declining
steadily over the past three decades, implying that go < g + n. Therefore, we need to
distinguish between the two cases where the growth of oil income, g0, is less than the natural
growth rate (the sum of the population growth, n, and the growth of technical progress, g)
and when g0  g + n. Under the former, the e¤ects of oil income on the economys steady
growth rate will vanish eventually, as is indeed the case for Indonesia.
We test our theory by using quarterly data on Indonesia, but before estimation we need
to determine the lag order of the VARX* model as well as the number of cointegrating
relations As for the other countries both the SBC and AIC select s^ = 2 and s^ = 1 for
Indonesia: Moreover, the maximal eigenvalue and the trace statistics suggest the presence
of one cointegrating relations at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels respectively (Table 5),
which is the same as that suggested by economic theory, thus we set r = 1.
Table 5: Cointegration Rank Test Statistics for the VARX*(2,1) Model with
Endogenous Variables (y, ep) and the Weakly Exogenous Variables (y*, xo)
H0 H1 Test statistic 95% Critical Values 90% Critical Values
(a) Maximal eigenvalue statistic
r = 0 r = 1 30.66 27.17 24.42
r  1 r = 2 6.54 18.22 16.23
(b) Trace statistic
r = 0 r = 1 37.20 37.78 33.83
r  1 r = 2 6.54 18.22 16.23
Notes: The underlying VARX* model is of order (2,1) and contains unrestricted intercept and restricted
trend coe¢ cients. yt and xot are treated as weakly exogenous, non-cointegrated I(1) variables. The test
statistics refer to Johansens log-likelihood-based maximum eigenvalue and trace statistics and are computed
using 121 observations from 1979Q4 to 2009Q4.
Imposing  2 =  3 together with  = 1, we obtain the estimates (standard errors in
brackets), b 2 = 0:0020 (0:0039) and b 1 = 0:998 (0:039), which conrms that  2 =  3 t 0.
Imposing  2 =  3 = 0, the LR statistic for testing all the 5 restrictions jointly is 24.58 which
is to be compared with the bootstrapped critical values of 19:48 and 25:41, implying that
the restrictions are rejected at the 5 percent level but not at the 1 percent level. Therefore,
in line with the theoretical discussions in Section 2.1 we conclude that oil income does not
enter the long-run output equation for Indonesia. Similar ndings are also to be expected for
other oil exporters with the growth of oil income, go, below the natural growth rate, g + n,
as was also found in the case of Mexico and Norway.
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4 Impulse Response E¤ects of Shocks to Oil Exports
and Foreign Output
The country specic VARX* models estimated in this paper can also be used to examine
the short term e¤ects of shocks to oil exports and foreign output.11 This is complementary
to the analysis of the e¤ects of oil price shocks on advanced economies that have been
investigated extensively in the literature. Initially, we consider the e¤ects of system-wide
shocks on the long-run output equations using the persistence proles, developed by Lee
and Pesaran (1993) and Pesaran and Shin (1996). On impact the persistence proles (PP)
are normalized to take the value of unity, but the rate at which they tend to zero provide
information on the speed with which equilibrium correction takes place in response to shocks.
The PP could initially over-shoot, thus exceeding unity, but must eventually tend to zero if
the long-run relationship under consideration is cointegrating. To investigate the e¤ects of
variable specic shocks on the oil exporters we make use of the Generalized Impulse Response
Functions (GIRFs), developed in Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran and Shin (1998). Unlike
the orthogonalized impulse responses popularized in macroeconomics by Sims (1980), the
GIRFs are invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VARX* model.
We shall focus on the six major oil exporters that pass the cointegration test, and do
not include Noway and Mexico in our analysis. For these two economies the PP and GIRFs
do not stabilize even after 40 quarters, supporting the outcome of the cointegration tests
reported in Table 2.
4.1 Persistence Proles
The Persistence Proles for the six major oil exporters, together with their 95% bootstrapped
error bands are provided in Figure 2. The proles overshoot before quickly tending to zero.
This is the case for all of the six oil exporters. The speed of convergence is very fast
and equilibrium is established after 2-3 years in most cases. Amongst the six countries,
Venezuela shows the fastest rate of convergence (around 2 years), and Saudi Arabia the
slowest rate of convergence (3-4 years). The 95% error bands are quite tight and widen
somewhat initially before narrowing down to zero. Overall, the proles are well estimated
with the possible exception of the PP for Nigeria. What is most striking is the much faster
speed of convergence obtained for the major oil exporters as compared, for example, with the
speed of convergence of output equations reported in Garratt et al. (2006) and Assenmacher-
Wesche and Pesaran (2009) for the UK and Switzerland respectively. This could be due to
the absence of fully developed capital and money markets in the economies of the major oil
exporters under consideration, which in turn allow little possibility for shock absorptions.
The recently established Sovereign Wealth Funds by oil exporters could, in principle, if used
appropriately act as shock absorbers which might lead to a more sluggish response of these
11For the purpose of impulse response analysis, the conditional model (30) is augmented with the following
marginal models for the exogenous variables
yt = 
 + yt 1 + "

t ; and xot = 
o + oxot 1 + "ot :
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economies to shocks in the future.
Figure 2: Persistence Proles of the E¤ect of a System-wide Shock to the Coin-
tegrating Relation (with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds)
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4.2 Generalized Impulse Responses
Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) can be computed for shocks to any of the
variables in the model, but they are more straightforward to interpret in the case of shocks
to the exogenous variables, namely oil exports and foreign output.
Consider rst the output e¤ects of a unit shock (equal to one standard error) to oil export
revenues. The associated GIRFs together with their 95% error bands are given in Figure
3. These gures clearly show that a positive shock to oil exports signicantly increases real
output in all six major oil exporters. In line with the rapid decay of the Persistence Proles,
the full impacts of oil revenue changes show up in these economies quite fast, and peak within
2-3 years in all cases. The equilibrium levels of these e¤ects (3%-4%) are also quite similar
across the economies, with the notable exception of Kuwait where the steady state value
of the e¤ect of the oil export shock is around 9%. This di¤erence partly reects the much
higher historical volatility of oil export revenues in Kuwait (due to invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq in 1990 and its aftermath). The quarterly standard deviation of oil export revenues for
Kuwait is around 35.5% as compared to 16.2% for Venezuela and Libya, 16.4% for Nigeria,
17.2% for Saudi Arabia, and 28.8% for Iran.
Figure 4 gives the plots of GIRFs for the e¤ects of a unit shock to foreign output on
domestic output across the six oil exporters. In comparison to the e¤ects of shocks to oil
export revenues, the e¤ects of foreign output shocks are muted and in some cases rather
poorly determined as judged by the 95% bootstrapped error bands. As to be expected from
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Figure 3: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive Unit shock to Oil Export
Revenues (with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds)
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Figure 4: Generalized Impulse Responses of a Positive Unit Shock to Foreign
Output (with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds)
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the cointegration test results the GIRFs all settle down within 2-3 years, with statistically
signicant permanent long-run e¤ects, except for Iran where the e¤ects of foreign output
shocks are statistically insignicant at all horizons. This is not surprising, given the Iranian
economys relative isolation from the rest of the world, and is in line with the rejection of
the co-trending restriction reported above.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper makes a theoretical contribution by showing the conditions under which income
from a resource can have a lasting impact on growth and per capita income. Using this
theoretical insight, it provides small quarterly models for eight major oil exporting economies,
six OPEC member countries (Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela)
as well as two OECD countries (Mexico and Norway), where the long-run implications of oil
exports for real output are tested. The results are supportive of the long-run theory, and
the estimated shares of capital are generally in line with those estimates provided in the
literature.
Moreover, this paper distinguishes between the oil exporters for which oil income-GDP
ratios have remained relatively stable (or in some cases increased) and those for which the
growth of oil income, g0, is less than the natural growth rate, g0 < g + n. An example of
the latter group is Indonesia, which recently left OPEC and has had its share of oil export
revenue in income falling for several decades. Using data on Indonesia, it is shown that if
g0 < g+n, then the e¤ects of oil income on the economys steady growth rate will eventually
vanish as there is no evidence for a long-run impact of oil income on real output.
The Persistence Proles of the e¤ects of system-wide shocks on cointegrating relations,
and the impulse response analysis of the e¤ects of shocks to oil export revenues and foreign
output, all point to a rather rapid adjustment of oil exporters to shocks. The e¤ects of these
shocks work themselves out within 2-3 years in most economies, the exception being Saudi
Arabia where it takes 3-4 years for the e¤ects of shocks to die out completely.
The research in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. It is desirable to
develop a more complete model for the OPEC member countries, possibly including other
important variables such as ination, interest rates, as well as other foreign variables. The
current VARX* models for the major oil exporters can be connected to the rest of the world
through oil exports and foreign real output. Although these are clearly the most important
channels of the transmission of shocks to oil economies, there could be others. It would be
interesting to see if the country-specic models of oil exporters can be linked to the global
model recently developed in Dees et al. (2007), where the di¤erential e¤ects of supply and
demand shocks and di¤erent regional shocks on the eight oil economies could be investigated.
The theoretical results of the paper can also be extended to allow for interactions between
the oil and non-oil sectors and the short-term e¤ects of oil price volatility. Such an extension
could, for example, help shed light on the importance of the National Development Fund in
Iran or the sovereign wealth funds formed in other oil exporting countries as shock absorbers.
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